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RECENT DECISIONS
praisal.14 The trial court, in the instant case, recognizing these prece-
ents, intimated that the plaintiff was limited to the statutory remedy.1 5
The principal case, in ruling that equity may intervene in a
proper instance,' 6 indicates that New York has now adopted the ma-
jority rule. In this, the court has made a wise decision. Since,
however, merger and consolidation plans may be just as oppressive
to dissenting minority shareholders, this equitable relief should not
be limited to sale of corporate assets situations.
In the majority of cases, of course, the dissenting stockholder
will have a just remedy in appraisal, and the courts should so limit
him. Further, as it is the policy of this state to guard against "strike
suits," 17 equity should intervene only in the clearest of situations.
It may be said, therefore, that this middle of the road policy, when
properly applied, seems to be to the best interests of both the ma-
jority and minority stockholders.
CRIMINAL PRocEDURE - AvAILABILiTY OF Co, AM NOBIS IN
FEDERAL PRACTICE.-In 1939, respondent pleaded guilty in a federal
district court to mail theft and was sentenced to a four-year term
which he duly served. In 1950, he was convicted of a state charge
and sentenced as a second offender because of the prior federal con-
viction.' Respondent, while in state prison, filed application for writ
of error coram nobis in the district court to vacate its judgment,
claiming he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel under
the Sixth Amendment.2 The application was denied but the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.3 The Supreme Court,
14 Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 202 Misc. 988, 115 N.Y.S.2d 52
(Sup. Ct. 1952).
15 See Eisenberg v. Central Zone Property Corp., 203 Misc. 59, 64, 116
N.Y.S.2d 154, 158 (Sup. Ct. 1952). The court then stated that the proposed
plan was more than a sale of assets and enjoined the creation of the voting
trust. Ibid.
26 "Stockholders may not be forced out of corporations by any such method
at the hands of directors or officers or 'principal stockholders' . ... The Legis-
lature never sanctioned such treatment of a minority stockholder and, on ap-
plication, equity will forbid it." Eisenberg v. Central Zone Property Corp.,
306 N.Y. 58, 66-67, 115 N.E.2d 652, 655-656 (1953).
17 This position is evidenced by the enactment of Section 61-b of the New
York General Corporation Law. See Lapchak v. Baker, 298 N.Y. 89, 80
N.E.2d 751 (1948).
' N.Y. PFxAr LAW § 1941.2 There may, however, be a waiver of this constitutional right. See
Chandler v. United States, 195 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1952) ; De Jordan v. United
States, 187 F.2d 262 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 942 (1951).
3 United States v. Morgan, 202 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1953).
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four justices dissenting, affirmed, and held that where a state court
has considered a prior federal conviction in imposing sentence, the
validity of the federal conviction may be inquired into by a motion
in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis though sentence has been
served. United States v. Morgan, 74 Sup. Ct. 247 (1954).
Quae coram nobis resident-let the record remain before us.
This was the literal meaning ascribed the writ of error coram nobis
at common law.4 Its function was to permit a court to review its own
judgment because of an alleged error of fact which did not appear on
the face of the record,5 but for which, judgment probably would not
have been entered.6 The writ was an exception to the common-law
rule that a court lost jurisdiction over a judgment, civil or criminal,
upon the expiration of the term at which it was entered.7 It first ap-
peared in the common law during the sixteenth century, but, appar-
ently the passage of time did not reflect a proportionate increase in
its employment.8
The remedy was employed in early criminal proceedings of sev-
eral states as a device to insure "fair and impartial" trials. One of
the first cases to consider the availability of the writ was Ex parte
Toney,9 where the court indicated that the defendant, an escaped
slave arraigned as a free person, might seek a vacatur of his convic-
tion by coram nobis, instead of habeas corpus, proceedings. In a
case of first impression, Adler v. State,10 an Arkansas court viewed
with favor an application for the writ because of the defendant's alleged
insanity at the time of trial. In Sanders v. State," a conviction was
vacated by means of the writ because the fear of mob violence had
induced a plea of guilty.
Employment of this remedy, however, was not to stop at this
point. Concomitant with the expansion of the due process concept
in several celebrated Supreme Court decisions,' 2 the writ, or a similar
motion, its modern counterpart, was employed in state courts as a
4 See FRANK, CORAm NoBIs iii (1953).5 See Adler v. State, 35 Ark. 517, 526 (1880) (writ might issue where the
defendant was under age and appeared by attorney, or if either party was fene
covert, or if either died before verdict).
6 See People v. Touhy, 397 Ill. 19, 72 N.E.2d 827, 830, cert. denied, 332
U.S. 791 (1947).
7 See United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67 (1914).
8 See FRANK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1.
9 11 Mo. 420 (1848).
20 35 Ark. 517 (1880).
1185 Ind. 318 (1882).
12 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (conviction obtained in
state court by use of coerced confession); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932) (failure of trial court to give defendants, charged with capital offense,
a reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel); Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U.S. 86 (1923) (mob-dominated trial causing an actual interference with the
course of justice) ; see Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112-113 (1935) (use
of testimony known to be perjured by the prosecution and withholding true
evidence to procure a confession thereby).
[ VOL.. 28
RECENT DECISIONS
post-trial proceeding to attack collaterally the legality of a conviction
apparently proper on its face.1
3
Whether or not coram nobis applied to criminal proceedings in
federal practice was a much disputed question until quite recently.
In the past, the Supreme Court had expressly declined to make the
decision.14 Earlier decisions seemed to negate the existence of the
writ in criminal matters.15 The enactment of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure failed to clarify the situation as the writ was
neither expressly excluded nor recognized.' However, it is apparent
that coram nobis, although superseded in form by a motion to vacate
or set aside the judgment,17 became an established part of federal
practice in the past decade. 8  Nevertheless, the "teeth" of the remedy
remained substantially unchanged, in that the court exercised a cor-
rectional jurisdiction at a subsequent term. Under such motions,
relief has been granted for failure to advise one of his constitutional
right to counsel and for failure to provide the same. 19 Perjured
testimony knowingly employed by the prosecution 20 and insanity 2 '
are also recognized as grounds for the granting of such relief. Judi-
cially imposed restrictions, however, required the defendant to allege
his innocence, to set forth a meritorious defense and to seek the remedy
13 See, e.g., People v. Guariglia, 303 N.Y. 338, 102 N.E.2d 580 (1951) (not
advised as to right of counsel, nor represented by authorized counsel); Matter
of Bojinoff v. People, 299 N.Y. 145, 85 N.E2d 909 (1949) (failure of court to
advise one of his right to counsel plus a failure to provide the same); Matter
of Lyons v. Goldstein, 290 N.Y. 19, 47 N.E.2d 425 (1943) (plea of guilty in-
duced by fraud and misrepresentation of the prosecution) ; People v. Sullivan,
276 App. Div. 1087, 96 N.Y.S.2d 266 (2d Dep't 1950) (plea of guilty induced
by a promise to "take care of the defendant"); People v. Glass, 201 Misc. 460,
114 N.Y.S.2d 635 (Gen. Sess. 1952) (indictment set forth no crime); People
v. Riley, 191 Misc. 888, 83 N.Y.S.2d 281 (County Ct. 1948) (suppression or
omission of material evidence by the prosecution) ; People v. Steele, 65 N.Y.S.2d
214 (Gen. Sess. 1946) (perjured testimony knowingly employed by the prosecu-
tion); see People ex rel. Rose v. Additon, 189 Misc. 102, 104, 73 N.Y.S.2d 561,
563 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (insanity when plea of guilty was made).
'4 See United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 68-69 (1914); United States v.
Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 475 n.4 (1947) ; Meredith v. United States, 138 F.2d 772,
773 (6th Cir. 1943).
25 See United States v. Luvisch, 17 F.2d 200, 202 (S.D. Mich. 1927) ; United
States v. Port Washington Brewing Co., 277 Fed. 306, 314 (E.D. Wis. 1921).
16 This was due, not to inadvertence, but rather to disagreement. See
Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure HI, 56 YALE L.J. 197,
233-234 (1947).
17 See Spaulding v. United States, 155 F.2d 919, 920 (6th Cir. 1946) ; Strang
v. United States, 53 F.2d 820, 821 (5th Cir. 1931) ; United States v. Luvisch,
supra note 15 at 202.
Is See Roberts v. United States, 158 F.2d 150 (4th Cir. 1946) ; Garrison v.
United States, 154 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1946) ; United States v. Steese, 144 F.2d
439 (3d Cir. 1944) ; see United States v. Monjar, 64 F. Supp. 746, 747 (D. Del.
1946).
19 United States v. Steese, supra note 18.
20 Garrison v. United States, supra note 18.
21 Cf. Roberts v. United States, su:pra note 18.
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with reasonable diligence.22
It is to be noted that one cannot attack collaterally a conviction
by habeas corpus proceedings unless he is presently detained under
that conviction.23  Thus, coram nobis was invoked in instances where
sentence had already been served if additional punishment had been
imposed under a multiple offender statute.24
With the enactment of Section 2255 of the Judicial Code,25 per-
mitting one to attack his conviction directly, a new problem faced the
courts. Did Congress, by the adoption of such statute, intend to pre-
empt the field of collateral attack as to coram nobis proceedings, or
were the remedies to be co-extensive? 28 The section, admittedly,
afforded relief to one who was "in custody" under a federal convic-
tion.27 Thus, relief was denied in instances where the federal sentence
had been served, even though the petitioner was serving additional
punishment under a state conviction because of the previous federal
offense.2 8  It would seem, therefore, that some courts considered
Section 2255 as the statutory replacement for the common-law remedy
of coram nobis.29  Certainly, there is no room for doubt as to the
availability of the remedy prior to the enactment of Section 2255.30
It has been stated by the Supreme Court that Section 2255 was en-
acted only ". .. to meet practical difficulties that had arisen in admin-
istering the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts. Nowhere
in the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to impinge
22 See United States v. Moore, 166 F2d 102 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
849 (1948).23 See United States v. Bradford, 194 F2d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1952). "As the
law now stands, the remedies open to a convict who is not in custody are limited
to an appeal from the judgment, and to a motion made under Rules 33, 34 and
35 ... I." d. at 201.
24 United States v. Steese, 144 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1944); ef. Roberts v.
United States, 158 F.2d 150 (4th Cir. 1946).
2528 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. 1950). This direct attack, limited to matters
that may be raised on collateral attack, is made not through habeas corpus pro-
ceedings in the district where the petitioner is imprisoned, but by motion in the
trial court which originally entertained jurisdiction. See FRANK, CoRAM NoBis
95, 112 (1953).
26 The better reasoning would appear to be that the remedies are co-extensive.
"It is only when there has been the denial of the substance of a fair trial that
the validity of the proceedings may be thus collaterally attacked or questioned
by motion in the nature of petition for writ of error coram nobis or under 28
U.S.C.A. 2255." Howell v. United States, 172 F.2d 213, 215 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 337 U.S. 906 (1949) (emphasis added). ". . . [T]he motion to vacate
permitted by the Code section [2255], although in the nature of coram nobis,
is not that writ, and its nature and meaning must be ascertained from the terms
of the statute." Bruno v. United States, 180 F.2d 393, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1950).27 United States v. Kerschman, 201 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1953); Farnsworth
v. United States, 198 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 915(1953) ; United States v. Lavelle, 194 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1952).
28 See note 27 supra.
29 See United States v. Calp, 83 F. Supp. 152, 153 (D. Md. 1949) ; United
States v. Morris, 83 F. Supp. 970, 971 (D.D.C. 1949).
30 See note 18 supra.
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upon prisoners' rights of collateral attack upon their convictions." 31
As previously noted, the Rules of Criminal Procedure did not ex-
pressly abolish this remedy, nor was one provided in its stead.3 2  On
the other hand, many cases have considered coram nobis,3 3 like habeas
corpus, 34 as a separate proceeding, civil in nature. If this be the
fact, it would seem that the remedy no longer exists, as the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure expressly abolished the writ.3 5  Closer
examination reveals, however, that there is sufficient authority for the
converse of the proposition, i.e., that coram nobis is not an indepen-
dent proceeding but part of the original trial.3 6
Nor should relief have been denied for any of the reasons stated
in the vigorous dissent.3 7  It is unnecessary for one, who is seeking
such relief, to allege his innocence and set forth facts showing a
meritorious defense as the question before the court is not one's
guilt or innocence, but rather the regularity of the proceedings at the
trial.3 8  It has also been stated that an unreasonable delay in seeking
relief will preclude review.3 9 There is no basis for this contention
under the factual situation of the instant case. There is no statute
of limitations applicable to such a motion in federal practice; 40 nor
could the respondent have sought review of the federal conviction
when he was convicted and sentenced in New York; 4 1 lastly, as no
jurisdiction may be acquired by the court, in the first instance, if one
is denied his constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment, 42 an
31United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952).
32 "But it must be remembered that not every right, constitutional or other-
wise, is mentioned or needs to be mentioned in the Rules." United States v.
Landicho, 72 F. Supp. 425, 427 (D. Alaska 1947).3 3 See Jones v. Squier, 195 F.2d 179, 180 (9th Cir. 1952) ; Smith v. State,
245 Ala. 161, 16 So. 2d 315, 316 (1944); State ex rel. Meyen v. Youngblood,
221 Ind. 408, 48 N.E2d 55 (1943); Elliott v. Commonwealth, 292 Ky. 614,
167 S.W.2d 703, 706 (1942), cert. denied sub nor. Elliott v. Buchanan, 319 U.S.
775 (1943).
34 See Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559-560 (1883).
35 See FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b). "Writs of coram nobis . . . are abolished,
and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion
as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action."
36See People v. Paiva, 31 Cal. 2d 503, 190 P.2d 604, 608 (1948) ; Irwin v.
State, 220 Ind. 228, 41 N.E.2d 809, 816 (1942) ; Dobbs v. State, 62 Kan. 108,
61 Pac. 408, 409 (1900), appeal disinissed, 184 U.S. 697 (1902).3 7 See United States v. Morgan, 74 Sup. Ct. 247, 253 (1954) (dissenting
opinion).oio See Barber v. United States, 142 F.2d 805, 806-807 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
322 U.S. 741 (1944) ; Allen v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 866, 869 (N.D. Ill.
1952).
39 See United States v. Moore, 166 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
334 U.S. 849 (1948); Spaulding v. United States, 155 F.2d 919, 921 (6th Cir.
1946).4 0 See United States v. Moore, supra note 39; United States v. Landicho, 72
F. Supp. 425, 427 (D. Alaska 1947).41 People v. McCullough, 300 N.Y. 107, 89 N.E.2d 335 (1949).
42Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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unreasonable delay cannot have the effect of improving the stature
of a void judgment.43  As the court lost its jurisdiction over the re-
spondent, possibly after sentence,44 but certainly after sentence had
been served, 45 the invocation of the "all-writs" section 46 by the
majority appears unwarranted in the instant case. From the fore-
going observations, it is seen that the remedy might be considered
• . . agreeable to the usages and principles of law." However, it is
difficult to see how the remedy was ". . . fiecessary or appropriate in
aid of their [the courts'] respective jurisdictions. . . ." Jurisdiction,
it would seem, must precede the granting of the writ, and must not
be acquired by reason of it. Nevertheless, the action of the majority
may be sustained on another theory. It is undeniable that a court
possesses power, independent of any statute, to correct its own judg-
ment especially to ". . . remedy an injustice . . . which goes to the
extent of depriving a man of his constitutional rights." 47
Had the respondent been denied relief in the instant case, he
would have been remediless. Habeas corpus and Section 2255 were
unavailable as the respondent was no longer in custody under the
federal conviction. 48  Nor was any other relief available under the
federal rules as the time for any pertifient motion had long since
passed.49
On principle, the remedy affording relief such as was granted in
the instant case, should exist. Instead of being deprived of his con-
stitutional right to counsel, as in the instant case, assume that peti-
tioner's conviction was based on perjured testimony knowingly em-
ployed by the prosecuting authorities. Assume further that the
petitioner did not learn of this until after he had served his sentence.
Is this man to carry the stigma of a felon for the rest of his life or
suffer additional unwarranted punishment as a multiple offender be-
43 See Allen v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 866, 868 (N.D. Ill. 1952). "As
to the Government's remaining contention, i.e., that Allen did not assert his
constitutional right [of counsel] with due diligence and, therefore, is not en-
titled to relief, the Court is unable to perceive its applicability. A void judg-
ment is as void today as it was twenty years ago. No aging process, whereby
a void judgment improves as to stature and validity by the passage of time, can
properly be interposed." Id. at 869.
44See United States v. Plumer, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,056, at 574 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1859).45 See United States v. Wright, 56 F. Supp. 489, 491 (E.D. Ill. 1944). How-
ever, in Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 220-221 (1946), the Supreme
Court indicated that although sentence bad been served, relief might have been
available to the petitioner had he shown that, under state or federal law, further
penalties could be imposed on him.
4628 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (Supp. 1950). "The Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in
aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles
of law."
47 See United States v. Steese, 144 F.2d 439, 442 (3d Cir. 1944).
48 See notes 23 and 27 supra.
49 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33, 34, 35.
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cause of the unjust conviction? Natural justice rebels at such a
thought. Nevertheless, such a result would follow if coram nobis were
unavailable as only a presidential pardon, an avenue discretionary if
not doubtful, could erase the felonious brand,
Certain undesirable consequences are foreseeable as a result of
the instant decision. Litigation often will not come to an end once
and for all as it should. Many unfounded or fabricated petitions will
undoubtedly find their way into the courts and serve to hamper the
administration of justice. Notwithstanding these consequences, fun-
damental rights must be assured in criminal proceedings. One of
these, the Sixth Amendment, is not a procedural formality and
".... stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safe-
guards it provides be lost, justice will not 'still be done.' "50
MILITARY LAw-CoURTS-MARTIAL-JUISDICTION TO TRY Dis-
CHARGED SERVICEMEN.- United States military authorities arrested
the accused, an honorably discharged veteran, for the murder of a
Korean national allegedly committed while the accused was in service.
He was immediately flown to Korea, where the crime took place, to
stand trial in a military court pursuant to Article 3 (a) of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. The District Court for the District of
Columbia, on petition, granted a writ of habeas corpus 1 and ordered
his release.2 Reversing this order, the Court of Appeals held that
Article 3(a) is a valid exercise of the congressional power to enact
rules regulating the armed services, and, further, that the due process
clause does not require a hearing before the removal of the accused
to the place of trial. Talbott v. Toth, No. 11964, D.C. Cir., March
25, 1954.
Originally, the United States Army,3 Navy,4 and Coast Guard 5
had separate systems of courts-martial. Under these systems, the
military courts could not try a civilian not connected with the mili-
tary, except during periods when martial law had been imposed upon
a specific area.6 Moreover, the courts' jurisdiction over a member of
50 See Allen v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 866, 868 (N.D. Ill. 1952).
I Toth v. Talbott, 113 F. Supp. 330 (D.D.C. 1953).
2 Toth v. Talbott, 114 F. Supp. 468 (D.D.C. 1953).
341 STAT. 787 (1920), 10 U.S.C. § 1471 et seq. (1946) (Articles of War-
also applicable, in amended form, to Air Force).
4 12 STAT. 600 (1862), 34 U.S.C. § 1200 (1946) (Articles for the Govern-
ment of the Navy).
5 34 STAT. 200 (1906), as amended, 14 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1946) (Disci-
plinary Law of the Coast Guard).
6 See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U.S. 1866).
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